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ABSTRACT.  CV researchers have found that the hypothetical values 
respondents place on a nested sequence of environmental goods are 
sensitive to the order in which the goods are presented.  Typically, the 
smallest bundle of goods is valued more highly if presented first than if 
following more comprehensive bundles.  Such effects appear even when 
each bundle is valued from an “exclusive” list, or as an alternative to any 
other, so that income and substitution effects are controlled.  Order of 
presentation has also affected the degree to which values are sensitive to 
scope.  We conduct lab experiments where participants are asked to value 
sequences of nested goods for actual purchase from an exclusive list using 
the incentive compatible BDM mechanism.  We test whether order effects 
occur in valuation for a) induced value goods, b) actual private goods, and 
c) identical private goods that are to be donated to charities.  We find 
significant order effects when the goods are valued for own use, but not 
when they are valued for donation. 
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  11.  Introduction and Literature Review 
  In recent years arguments over the reliability of contingent valuation (CV) have 
come to focus on the method’s construct validity, or the internal consistency of its 
answers according to economic theory.  Striking valuation anomalies have been 
identified, prompting CV researchers to examine more closely what economic theory 
does and does not predict.  This in turn has led to more precisely formulated validity tests 
and nuanced discussions of the circumstances under which CV responses can be, if not 
accepted by all, at least internally consistent.   
A prime example of this winnowing process has been the “embedding” effect 
named by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), and previously identified by Randall et al. 
(1981).  These authors found that the value respondents place on an environmental good 
seems to depend on whether it is valued in isolation, or as part of a more inclusive good.  
Others such as Brookshire (1981) found that the value respondents assigned to a good (air 
quality) could vary according to the order in which that quantity appeared relative to 
others.  In response, researchers such as Randall and Hoehn (1996) identified conditions 
under which substitution effects and constrained endowments could rationally result in 
embedding effects.  Carson, Flores and Hanemann (1998) showed that if rationed public 
goods are strict Hicksian substitutes and normal goods, willingness to pay (WTP) for 
them should decrease, the further out in a sequence they are valued.  As the debate 
progressed, Carson and Mitchell (1995) proposed that “embedding” effects be divided  
into the more precise “scope” and “sequence” effects.  With regard to scope, the values 
respondents place on an environmental project should be weakly increasing in its scope 
or size (though not strictly increasing if satiation is a possibility).  Sensitivity to scope can 
  2be tested internally, by asking the same subjects to value a nested sequence of goods, or 
externally, by asking different subjects to value different levels of the sequence.  With 
regard to sequence, the value respondents place on an environmental (public) good 
presented in a nested sequence should depend on the order of presentation because of 
substitution and income effects.  However the total valuation of all projects in the 
sequence should be independent of order. 
Regarding empirical tests of scope, Carson (1997) surveys over 30 studies that 
use external split samples to test explicitly for scope insensitivity, and reject it.  Carson 
cites an additional handful of well-known exceptions such as Kahneman and Knetsch 
(1992), Diamond et al. (1993) and Desvousges et al. (1992, 1993) that do not reject 
insensitivity to scope, but criticizes their survey design, sample size, or the low power of 
their statistical tests.   More recently, however, Heberlein et al.(2005) have criticized 
conventional scope tests that compare average valuation results across samples for 
masking false positive and negatives at the individual level.  
Regarding empirical tests of sequence effects, the ability of researchers to 
evaluate the validity of CV took a major step forward with Bateman et al.’s (2004) 
observation that multiple valuations could be made from an inclusive or exclusive list.  In 
inclusive lists, each subsequent good is presented as an addition to goods already 
presented and valued.  In contrast, in exclusive lists, each good is presented as a mutually 
exclusive alternative to any other good presented.  While substitution and income effects 
imply that the valuation of a good from an inclusive list should depend on sequence, they 
should be controlled for in valuation from an exclusive list.  Furthermore, exclusive lists 
should also maintain reference utility at the status quo from which each good is proposed 
  3as an alternative, so that loss aversion or reference dependent preferences (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991)) should not influence valuation according to order.  Economic theory 
thus provides a clean prediction that the valuation of individual goods should not be 
affected by the sequence in which they are presented if they appear on a mutually 
exclusive list.  Bateman et al. (2004) thus distinguish “sequence effects” in valuations 
from inclusive lists (which should be expected) from “order effects” in valuations from 
exclusive lists (which should not).   
The evidence regarding order effects from exclusive lists in CV is sparse, in part 
because earlier studies do not make it clear if respondents valued multiple projects from 
an inclusive or exclusive list.  Boyle et al. (1993) find that inexperienced white water 
boaters exhibited order effects in valuing alternative levels of water flow in the Grand 
Canyon, but that experienced boaters did not.  Bateman and Langford (1996) and Payne 
et al. (2000) both find strong sequence/order effects in valuations of multiple payment 
vehicles or multiple environmental goods.  The latter authors find that WTP is much 
larger for the first project evaluated than for those evaluated subsequently.  However 
neither study makes it clear whether respondents knew they were valuing each proposal 
as alternatives or incremental additions. 
The clearest evidence concerning order effects from exclusive list CV comes from 
Powe and Bateman (2003) and Bateman et al. (2004).  Powe and Bateman find 
significant order effects in WTP for the prevention of salt water flooding in the Norfolk 
Broads (wetlands) in eastern England.  In particular, Powe and Bateman used a 
dichotomous choice CV survey to ask visitors to the Norfolk Broads their WTP to 
prevent saline flooding for a smaller (nested) and larger part of the wetlands.  WTP to 
  4prevent saline flooding in the smaller part was higher if it was elicited prior to that for the 
larger part, than if it was elicited after.   To a lesser but still significant degree, WTP to 
prevent saline flooding in the larger area was larger if it followed the elicitation of WTP 
for a part, rather than preceding it.  Powe and Bateman attribute the order effects either to 
strategic misrepresentation of WTP, or “non preference based” explanations such as the 
purchase of moral satisfaction (Kahenman and Knetsch (1992)) or anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics (Kahneman et al. (1982)). 
Bateman et al. (2004) conduct an analogous exercise as Powe and Bateman, but 
using open ended contingent valuation, and with the added distinction of using 
“stepwise” or “advanced” disclosure to respondents of the sequence of goods they would 
be asked to value.  Bateman et al. (2004) first conduct a CV survey of a student 
population for three nested levels of environmental improvement for a lake adjacent to 
the University of East Anglia.  They then conduct two field CV tests, the first using 
advanced disclosure concerning three levels of water quality in the River Tame at 
Birmingham.  The second field CV test used stepwise disclosure, again concerning the 
prevention of saline flooding at two levels of geographic extent in the Norfolk Broads. 
As with Powe and Bateman, Bateman et al. find that even with exclusive 
valuation, WTP for a specified good depends on the order in which it is presented.  As 
before, the WTP for the smallest scope of a project was greater when that level was 
presented first, rather than following projects of greater scope.  This was true both of the 
student sample, and of the sample of visitors to the Norfolk Broads.  Interestingly, 
however, Bateman et al. find that all order effects were eliminated in those treatments 
where respondents were given advanced descriptions of all levels of the projects before 
  5being asked to provide values for any.   In related findings, the degree of sensitivity of 
WTP to scope was dramatically affected by the sequence of presentation in stepwise 
disclosure treatments, but not in advanced disclosure treatments. 
In discussing the order effects under stepwise disclosure, Bateman et al. (2004) 
concede they could be due to the purchase of moral satisfaction, but query why such 
effects do not then persist under advanced disclosure.  Alternatively, the authors note that 
strategic incentives to misreport WTP could differ during the stepwise treatment but 
remain constant under advanced disclosure, or that perhaps loss aversion could be 
playing a role (despite reference utility being held constant).  Finally, the authors 
speculate that there is a psychological element of surprise in stepwise disclosure absent in 
advanced disclosure, because respondents are suddenly asked their WTP for a greater (or 
lesser) project than was originally described.  Disgruntled (relieved) respondents could 
respond to the implication that they are expected to pay yet more (less) by raising their 
WTP for projects of greater scope by less than they otherwise would, and lowering their 
WTP for projects of lesser scope by less than they otherwise would. 
While limited in number, the above studies suggest that the construct validity of 
contingent valuation remains open to doubt regarding order effects.  In cases where 
economic theory clearly predicts invariance, researchers have found that the valuation 
given for a specific project seems dependent on the order in which it is presented relative 
to projects of greater or lesser scope.  This occurs even when alternative projects are 
clearly presented as mutually exclusive alternatives to the status quo. 
This paper’s contribution is to use laboratory experiments to shed light on the 
possible explanations that have been offered for order effects observed in CV.  In 
  6particular, we shall test whether order effects persist in the valuation of nested goods 
from an exclusive list even when 1) the goods are private, 2) strategic considerations are 
eliminated, 3) decisions are non-hypothetical, and 4) the potential for warm glow/moral 
satisfaction is controlled for.  We ask laboratory subjects their maximum WTP for three 
levels of a nested good, using the incentive compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism (Becker et al. (1964)).   Using stepwise disclosure, half the subjects 
see and value the good bundles from smallest to largest (“bottom up”), and half from 
largest to smallest (“top down”).  A control treatment elicits maximum WTP for private, 
induced value goods, to ensure that subjects understand the incentive compatible 
properties of the BDM.  A second treatment elicits bids for private actual goods.  A third 
treatment elicits bids for the same actual goods, but in order for them to be donated to 
specific charities.   
We find that 1) order effects persist even for private market goods that are 
actually purchased, and that 2) the introduction of strong warm glow considerations in the 
formation of WTP eliminates these effects.  
 
2.  Experimental Design       
2.1 Eliciting Valuations 
  A growing number of researchers are using incentive compatible auction 
mechanisms in experiments to elicit valuation responses in order to shed light on CV 
preference anomalies (Noussair et al. (2004), Bateman et al. (1997a), Bateman et al. 
(1997b), Coursey, Hovis and Schulze (1987), Shogren et al. (1994)).  Economists hope 
that valuations provided with strategic incentives to be truthful will be more reliable than 
  7those asked hypothetically, with ambiguous strategic incentives.  Better incentives are 
purchased at a cost, however, as these experimental auctions are carried out for 
excludable (private) goods far removed from typical CV applications, and are typically 
run with paid student volunteers rather than random samples from the general population. 
  Popular mechanisms used have included second (or n
th) price sealed bid auctions 
(Vickrey (1961)), the sequential English auction, which is demand revealing for all but 
the highest bidder, and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al. 
(1964)).  Under the BDM, subjects simultaneously submit bids for a good, and a sale 
price is then drawn at random from a pre-specified distribution.  All those whose bids 
equal or exceed the sale price receive the good, and pay the sale price.  The rest pay 
nothing and do not purchase the good.  Bidders have a dominant strategy to bid an 
amount equal to their true maximum WTP, regardless of risk preference or beliefs about 
others’ strategies.   
The BDM has come to be favoured for applications where researchers want 
subjects to make sequential valuations without being influenced by others’ valuations as 
conveyed by the winning bid in previous rounds (Bateman et al. (1997a), (1997b), 
Noussair et al. (2004)).  A sale price determined at random conveys no such information.  
One drawback of the BDM is its counter-intuitive nature; subjects must be convinced that 
it is truly in their interests to bid their maximum WTP.  Combining approaches from 
previous researchers (Davis and Holt (1993, p. 490), Noussair et al. (2004)), we spend 
considerable time asserting, explaining, and demonstrating the incentive properties of the 
BDM to subjects during four practice rounds that preceded valuation decisions in all 
treatments of the experiment.  These will be described in greater detail below.  Three of 
  8the four practice rounds used induced value goods, and our control treatment used 
induced value goods throughout the valuation sequence.  In this way, we can verify that 
the BDM is eliciting subjects’ maximum WTP in practice as well as in theory.   
2.2   Order effects in nested good valuation 
 
  Our experimental design testing for order effects follows closely the CV design 
used by Bateman et al. (2004).  In the main decision rounds, subjects were endowed with 
(Can.) $22, and asked their “maximum purchase price” for a nested sequence of three 
bundles of goods.  The valuations were from an exclusive list, in that the experimental 
instructions emphasized that a market would be implemented only for one of the three 
bundles valued, to be chosen at random at the end of the experiment.  The sequence of 
goods was described and valued in stepwise fashion.
1 Subjects were given prior 
experience with this exclusive list procedure, in that only one of the four practice rounds, 
chosen at random, was implemented before the main decision rounds.  Random draws 
concerning round selection and sale price were carried out with a bingo cage. 
  Half of subjects were asked to value a nested sequence of goods from smallest to 
greatest, or “bottom up”, and half from greatest to smallest, or “top down.”  For those 
subjects in the control Treatment I, the goods in question all had induced values.  In 
bottom up order, they were 1) a green slip of paper, 2) a green and a yellow slip of paper, 
and finally 3) a green and a yellow and a blue slip of paper.  The induced value of each 
coloured slip differed across subjects, and each was drawn from the uniform distribution 
                                                 
1   To avoid any element of unethical “surprise,” we followed Payne et al. (2000) in informing subjects at 
the outset that they would be making three valuation decisions, but without giving any advanced indication 
as to the nature of the goods or bundles to be valued.  This actually moves our design a small step towards 
advanced disclosure, which from Bateman et al. (2004) should make order effects less likely to occur.  
  9[$0, $7.00] in ten cent increments.
2  Thus the combined value of the sequence of goods in 
bottom up order was contained in the ranges [$0, $7], [$0, $14] and [$0, $21], 
respectively.  Subjects knew that induced values varied across participants, but not the 
distribution or range from which they were determined.     
  For those subjects in Treatment II, induced value goods were replaced by actual 
market goods for the main decision rounds.  In bottom up order, the nested sequence was  
1.   A 10 pack of 200 ml drink boxes of Minute Maid brand orange juice, or  J. 
2.  J plus a stationary set comprised of a pack of five Staples brand retractable gel 
ink pens (two black, one blue, one red and one green) and one BiC Wite-Out 
brand correction tape, or J,S. 
3.  J, S plus a Media brand 27 exposure disposable 35 mm camera with built in 
flash, or J,S,C.  
Prior to each valuation decision, the relevant bundle of goods was displayed on a tray and 
presented to each subject individually for his or her inspection. 
  For those subjects in Treatment III, the same goods were presented as in 
Treatment II.  Here however, participants were asked their maximum purchase price from 
their $22 endowments to donate the bundles of goods to specific charities.  If the 
“market” for a particular bundle was implemented, those whose maximum purchase price 
for donation equaled or exceeded the sale price would pay the sale price to the 
experimenter, and that bundle of goods would be donated to the appropriate charities.  If 
not, the person would keep the entire $22 endowment, and the good(s) would not be 
donated on his or her behalf.  The charities receiving the donations were as follows: 
                                                 
2   The same induced values that were drawn randomly for the participants in a "bottom up" session were 
then also used in reverse order for participants in a "top down" session. 
  101.  J  went to the Calgary Inter-Faith Food Bank, the single largest food bank in          
Calgary, Alberta. 
2.  S went to students at the Salvation Army’s Children’s Village, an elementary 
school in Calgary for children with severe behavioural/emotional difficulties 
3.  C went to children at the Salvation Army’s Pine Lake Camp, a summer camp 
near Red Deer, Alberta for children from disadvantaged families who could 
not otherwise afford summer camp. 
Following Eckel and Grossman (2003), care was taken to ensure the credibility of the 
claim that donations of goods would in fact be carried out.  Aside from general 
assurances at the outset that deception was not used and that the experiment passed 
human ethics review, letters from the appropriate charities acknowledging their 
participation in this research exercise were shown to subjects prior to making each 
valuation decision.  Pamphlets describing each charity’s work were also provided when 
the goods for donation were displayed.
3
  Sale prices for all bundles of goods were drawn from the uniform distribution, 
with ranges to be explained.  For the four practice rounds that were common to all three 
treatments, the items valued respectively were a mini Mars Bar, and then three induced 
value coloured slips of paper.  The induced values of these slips of paper varied between 
subject and between rounds, but (unbeknownst to subjects) were drawn from the uniform 
distribution between [$0, $2].  For each practice round subjects were informed that the 
potential sale price would be drawn from the range [$.05, $2.00] in five cent increments.  
For the three main decision rounds in all three treatments, subjects were informed that the 
                                                 
3   Subjects in Treatment III were also asked in a post experimental questionnaire “when making your 
decisions today, did you feel confident that any items you purchased for donation in the experiment really 
would go to the charities as described?”  92 of 95 subjects answered the question, of whom 96% said “yes.”   
  11sale price would be drawn from the [$.10, $7.00] range in ten cent increments for the 
smallest bundle, the [$.20,$14.00] range in twenty cent increments for the intermediate 
bundle, and the [$.25, $21] range in twenty-five cent increments for the largest bundle.  
Altering the range of sale prices for larger bundles has the potential to signal subjects that 
we expect bids to rise with the scope of the bundle (Bohm et al. (1997)), but ensured that 
subjects had a non-trivial probability of purchasing even the smallest scope of good.  
Endowments were set to exceed the maximum possible sale price in all cases, while the 
latter were set high enough that subjects would in all likelihood choose to bid below 
them.
4  This ensured that subjects could secure the probability of purchasing a bundle 
with probability one, but would be unlikely to do so. 
Sessions were run with 12 subjects at a time, and lasted roughly 90 minutes.  
Subjects were paid a $3 endowment up front from which to make bids during the four 
practice rounds, and $22 in advance from which to make bids during the three main 
valuation rounds.
5  Final earnings were thus $25 per subject, plus any goods purchased, 
less their sale price(s).  235 enrolled student subjects were recruited from the University 
of Calgary between February 16
th and October 5
th 2005.  The allocation of subjects to 




                                                 
4   While not announced to subjects, the retail prices of the juice, stationary and camera were (Canadian) 
$3.67, $7.00 and $6.13 respectively.  Transactions costs aside, the retail prices of the nested bundles 
(bottom up) were thus $3.67, $10.67 and $16.80. 
 
5   Subjects signed consent forms agreeing that they could keep the endowments only if they stayed for the 
duration of the experiment.  Their student ID cards were held for the duration of the experiment as security.  
  12Table 1 
Experimental design and sub-sample labels 
                       List Direction 
     __________________________________________ 
                 Bottom Up (B)       Top Down (T) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  T r e a t m e n t   I      S IB    SIT  
  Self,  Induced  Value  (SI)    n = 20     n = 24    
 
  T r e a t m e n t   I I      S B     S T    
    Self, Actual       (S)    n = 48     n = 48  
 
  T r e a t m e n t   I I I      C B     C T  





3.  Results 
3.1 Learning to report maximum valuation in the BDM 
  There is encouraging evidence that subjects mastered the incentives of the BDM 
mechanism under our comprehensive approach. The experimental instructions explicitly 
informed subjects in bold that “it will always be in your best interest to give your true 
maximum value,” and gave the reasoning why using two symmetric examples of over- 
and under-valuation, respectively.  For each of the four practice rounds, each subject’s 
induced value and reported maximum purchase price were sorted by the former (if 
available) or the latter, and written on a large whiteboard.  A sale price was then drawn 
and announced.  Following Noussair et al. (2004), subjects were collectively asked 1) to 
identify who would receive the item if the market for that round were implemented, 2) 
what price the purchasers would pay, and 3) whether anyone would regret the purchase 
price that he or she reported.  The experimenter pointed out examples of potential regret 
caused by over- or under-stated reports of maximum purchase price.   
  13With this feedback provided, reported purchase prices converged towards induced 
value across the three practice rounds that used induced value goods.  Pooling all 
subjects, the percentage who reported a maximum purchase price within ± $.20 of 
induced value rose from 67% in the first practice round with induced values, to 75% in 
the second, to 86% in the third.
6,7  The subsequent results from the main valuation 
decisions in Treatment I suggest that the practice experience with the BDM was fully 
exploited.  With stakes raised, the percentage of Treatment I subjects who were within ± 
$.20 of induced value was 84% for the first main bundle evaluated (whether the largest or 
smallest), 91% for the second, and 84% for the third.  Alternatively, since a $.20 
difference between maximum purchase price and induced value seems proportionately 
less troubling at the greater scales of induced values used in the main rounds of 
Treatment I, we could instead ask whether subjects there reported a maximum purchase 
price within ± 10% of induced value.  93% were within that band for the first main round, 
96% were for the second, and 93% were for the third.  Either measure increases our 
confidence that the three valuations of interest from subjects in Treatments II and III 
closely reflect their true maximum willingness to pay, to the best of their abilities. 
3.2  Order Effects  
  Perhaps the most interesting results of this paper are that we find evidence of 
order effects similar to those found in CV, even in the non-hypothetical valuation of 
private market goods.  Yet such effects are absent when the purchase of moral 
                                                 
6   The discrete five cent increments in the sales price range for the practice rounds meant that subjects 
could shave up to five cents off their bids or inflate by up to four cents without being strictly worse off.  
Analogous (bottom up) bands of [-$.10,$.09], [-$.20, $.19] and [-$.25,$.24] exist in the three main rounds.  
 
7   Appendix 1 provides a summary of the distribution of discrepancies between maximum purchase price 
and induced value for the final practice round. 
  14satisfaction becomes a prominent consideration.  Following the structure of analysis in 
Bateman et al. (2004), here is what we find. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the mean valuations of the three nested bundles of goods by 
order of presentation, first for induced value goods (a), then for actual goods for self (c), 
then for actual goods for charities (e).  Because mean WTP can be skewed by outliers, 
corresponding medians are also shown in (b), (d) and (f).  As we would expect from the 
success of the BDM, no order effects appear for induced value goods ((a) and (b)).  In 
contrast, for actual goods (c) and (d) there is the familiar pattern that subjects on average 
are willing to pay more for smaller consumption bundles when considered before more 
inclusive bundles than when considered after, and more for larger consumption bundles 
when considered after less inclusive bundles than when considered before.  In contrast, 
when the good(s) are being valued for donation to different charities, subjects on average 
appear willing to pay the same amount regardless of order of valuation.  Also of interest 
is that (different) students on average were willing to pay almost as much to donate the 
particular goods to charities as they were to purchase them for themselves.
8    
Moving to numbers, descriptive statistics by means and medians are summarized 
in Table 2.  As in Figure 1, mean and median valuations are very similar regardless of 
order in the induced value treatment.  In contrast, when actual goods for own use are 
valued, there is a 43% mean WTP premium for J when it is valued first rather than last, a 
32% premium for J,S when it valued after J rather than after J,S,C, and a 15% premium 
for  J,S,C when it is valued after smaller bundles than when valued first.  The 
                                                 
 
8   This may reflect the suitability of the goods for the charitable uses specified, and their lack of suitability 
to university students.  Some commented in the post experiment questionnaire that they did not really need 
the goods on offer, so would not pay much for them.  No such comments appeared for participants in 
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Fig. 1.  Order Effects    
  17Table 2 
Mean and Median WTP for Induced, Private and Donated Bundles 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample          Mean WTP  (Can $)          Median WTP (Can $) 
  ____________________________  ______________________________ 
        J 
a        J,S      J,S,C         J        J,S      J,S,C   
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SIB    3.18       5.87   10.67      2.90       6.60  11.90   
N=20   (.430)
b       (.475)  (.650)      (.539)       (.595)  (.814) 
  
SIT    3.04       5.91  10.31      2.73       6.65  11.90 
N=20
c   (.421)       (.478)  (.724)      (.528)       (.599)  (.907) 
 
 
SB    2.40       4.58  7.01      2.00       4.00   5.68 
N=48   (.356)       (.463)  (.753)      (.446)       (.580)  (.943)   
 
ST    1.67       3.48  6.07      1.50       3.50   5.00 
N=48   (.172)        (.354)  (.581)      (.216)      (.443)  (.729) 
 
 
CB    2.19       3.85  5.81      2.00       2.60             5.00   
N=47   (.255)       (.416)  (.654)      (.320)       (.522)  (.820) 
 
CT    2.21       3.67  6.01      1.73       3.00   5.00 
N=48   (.253)       (.442)  (.734)      (.317)       (.554)  (.920) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
a  For the induced value Treatment, J refers to one slip of paper, J,S refer to two slips of paper, 
etc.  
b  Standard errors.  The standard error calculation procedure for medians assumes a large 
sample and normal distribution, and is given in Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1984, 677).  
c  For 
purposes of fair comparison, the four valuation observations of subjects in SIT with induced 
values set according to those of the four missing observations in SIB are excluded. 




corresponding median WTP premiums are 33%, 14%, and 14%.  In contrast, order effects 
appear negligible and inconsistent for goods bundles being valued for donation. With 
regard to scope sensitivity, both the means and medians in Table 2 suggest that valuations 
are rising in scope, whether internally across rows, or externally comparing the diagonal 
first responses of (different) respondents for J and J,S,C within each treatment. 
  18  Turning to formal statistical analysis, we follow Bateman et al. (2004) in testing 
for order and scope effects in three different ways.  We begin with univariate tests of 
differences in means using t tests, and in medians using Mann Whitney tests.  We finish 
with multivariate analysis.   For the effects of order on gross bundle valuation, we test 
hypotheses of the form: 
 WTPi,B(X) = WTP B i,T(X)  i = SI, S or C,   X = J or J,S  or J,S,C. (1) 
To test for sensitivity to scope, we use external (split sample) tests of whether subjects 
provide identical valuations for the first bundle they see, regardless of size: 
 WTPi,B(J) = WTP B i,T(J,S,C)  i = SI,  S  or  C.      (2) 
Finally, to test whether order influences the degree of scope sensitivity, we ask whether 
the marginal valuation of S or C or S,C together differs by order: 
MWTPi,B(S)  ≡   WTPi,B(J,S) - WTPi,B(J) =  
WTPi,T(J,S) - WTPi,T(J)  ≡  MWTPi,T(S)        
 MWTPi,B(C)  ≡    WTPi,B(J,S,C) - WTPi,B(J,S) =  
WTPi,T(J,S,C) - WTPi,T(J,S)  ≡  MWTPi,T(C)     (3) 
MWTPi,B(S,C)  ≡   WTPi,B(J,S,C) - WTPi,B(J) =  
WTPi,T(J,S,C) - WTPi,T(J)  ≡  MWTPi,T(S,C)           
where i = SI, S or C.  Probability values of each of our test results are reported in Table 3. 
From Table 3, simple difference in means tests do indeed find significant effects 
of order on WTP for actual bundles J and for J,S when valued for self (ρ values = .072, 
.061 respectively).  These t tests do not find significant order effects for J,S,C when 
valued for self, nor for any size of bundle in the induced value or charity treatments.  
Reassuringly, they find that valuations are sensitive to scope in external tests for all three 
  19Table 3 
Significance of order and scope effects using t- , Median and Regression Analysis 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Hypothesis            Difference in          Difference in        Difference using 
                   means
*                 medians             regression analysis  
                  
                  (ρ value)       (asymptotic ρ value)         (ρ value) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Tests of Order Effects 
 
  1.  WTPSIB(J) = WTPSIT(J)    0.817         0.818    0.854   
  2.  WTPSIB(J,S) = WTPSIT(J,S)   0.964         0.957    0.969 
  3.  WTPSIB(J,S,C) = WTPSIT(J,S,C)  0.714         0.745    0.636 
 
  4.  WTPSB(J) = WTPST(J)   0.072         0.215    0.027  
  5.  WTPSB(J,S) = WTPST(J,S)   0.061         0.089   0.006 
  6.  WTPSB(J,S,C) = WTPST(J,S,C)  0.328          0.597    0.024 
 
  7.  WTPCB(J) = WTPCT(J)    0.949         0.937    0.398 
  8.  WTPCB(J,S) = WTPCT(J,S)    0.764         0.576    0.220 
  9.  WTPCB(J,S,C) = WTPCT(J,S,C)  0.844         0.938    0.482 
 
External Tests of Scope Effects 
  by First Response 
 
  10.  WTPSIB(J) = WTPSIT(J,S,C)  0.000         0.000    0.000 
11.  WTPSB(J) = WTPST(J,S,C)   0.000         0.000   0.000        
12.  WTPCB(J) = WTPCT(J,S,C)   0.000         0.000   0.000 
 
Consistency of Scope Effects 
  by Order 
 
  13.  MWTPSIB(S) = MWTPSIT(S)  0.789        0.892      0.793 
  14.  MWTPSIB(C)  = MWTPSIT(C)  0.561        0.978      0.547 
  15.  MWTPSIB(S,C) = MWTPSIT(S,C)  0.810        0.892      0.811 
   
  16.  MWTPSB(S) = MWTPST(S)  0.290         0.340    0.181 
  17.  MWTPSB(C) = MWTPST(C)  0.730         0.656    0.939 
  18.  MWTPSB(S,C) = MWTPST(S,C)  0.766         0.974    0.432 
 
  19.  MWTPCB(S) = MWTPCT(S)  0.538         0.700    0.627 
  20.  MWTPCB(C) = MWTPCT(C)  0.452         0.283    0.374 
  21.  MWTPCB(S,C) = MWTPCT(S,C)  0.820         0.841    0.820 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All tests two tailed.  P values in bold are significant at the 10% level.  t- and Mann-Whitney 
medians tests run on SPSS 11.5.  Multivariate analysis run on SPSS 7.0.  For the details of the 
multivariate analysis, see Appendix 2.  
* Equality of variance not assumed if rejected by an F test 
at the 10% level.  
  20treatments (hypotheses 10-12).  Finally, t tests find that the order effects found in the 
valuation of bundles of private goods are not sufficient to affect the marginal valuation of 
S, C, or S+C in that or either of the other treatments (hypotheses 13-21).  Moving to a 
comparison of medians, Mann-Whitney tests provide similar findings as the t tests, 
except that the median valuation for the bundle J,S when valued for self is no longer 
significantly different when bottom up ($4.00) than when top down ($3.50).   
One drawback of both t- and median tests is that neither explicitly allow for the 
effect of respondents’ characteristics on their valuations, or exploit the information that 
each individual provides three valuations.  Thus, following Payne et al. (2000) and 
Bateman et al. (2004), we lastly test for order and scope effects using a random effects 
Tobit panel data model, which allows for left censoring of WTP at zero.  As laid out in 
Appendix 2, we regress WTP on 5 of 6 possible bundle/order dummies and other 
covariates for each of the three treatments.
9  The covariates were collected in a post 
experiment questionnaire, including age, year of university, gender, whether Economics 
courses had been completed, first language, and frequency of donation to charities.  Only 
those covariates that were significant in a given treatment were retained.  In particular, 
students for whom English was a second language bid significantly more for actual items 
for self in Treatment II, while students who had completed economics courses bid 
significantly less to donate items to charities in Treatment III.  We then test for sensitivity 
to order or scope using Wald tests of equality between the coefficients on the appropriate 
bundle/order dummies.  For example, the effect of order on WTP for actual good J for 
                                                 
9   The omitted dummy variables were Induced Self Bottom (J,S) in Treatment I, Self Bottom (J,S) in 
Treatment II, and Charity Bottom (J,S) in Treatment III.  Other specifications were also tried, resulting in  
Wald test results with identical p values as those reported. 
 
  21self compares the coefficients on the dummy variables “Self Bottom (J)” and “Self Top 
(J)” in the regression using data from Treatment II.        
  As seen in the final column of Table 3, the Wald test results are consistent with 
those of the univariate tests, with the evidence of order effects in Treatment II slightly 
strengthened.  In particular, WTP for own purchase differs significantly by order of 
valuation for all three bundle levels (J, J,S and J,S,C), rather than just for two levels (J 
and J,S) using t tests, or at one level (J,S) using the Mann Whitney test. Otherwise, 
multivariate analysis corroborates the earlier findings that WTP is not sensitive to order 
effects for induced value goods or goods donated to charities, but that it is sensitive to 
scope for all three treatments. 
  Finally, to test for an effect of order on sensitivity to scope, we follow Bateman et 
al. (2004) in allowing that the marginal WTP (MWTP) across bundles can be negative or 
positive, and so use a random effects generalized least squares (GLS) panel regression.  
Because the MWTP(C) and MWTP(S) are not independent of the MWTP(S,C) only 
observations for the first two were used.  Again as laid out in Appendix 2, we regress 
MWTP on 3 of 4 possible dummies for differences in bundle and order and on other 
covariates for each of the three treatments.
10  Again, only those covariates that were 
significant for a given treatment were retained.    It should be noted that in general the fit 
of the GLS regression is not as good as that for the Tobit analysis.  We tested for the 
effect of order on the degree of scope sensitivity using Wald tests of equality of 
coefficients on the appropriate dummies.  Again as seen in the final column of Table 3, 
multivariate analysis concurs with the univariate tests in finding that the order effects 
                                                 
10   The omitted dummy variable was   Induced Self Bottom (J,S) – Induced Self Bottom (J) for Treatment 
I, Self Bottom (J,S) – Self Bottom (J) for Treatment II, and Charity Bottom (J,S) – Charity Bottom (J) for 
Treatment III.  
  22found in the valuation of bundles of private goods are not sufficient to affect the degree 
of sensitivity to scope in Treatment II, or in either of the other two treatments.  
 
4.  Is Confusion the Cause? 
  Whether by univariate or multivariate tests, we have found evidence that the order 
in which nested private goods are presented can affect the valuation that experimental 
subjects assign to them.  In particular, a given bundle of goods seems to suffer by relative 
comparison with greater bundles that have already been viewed.  These order effects have 
emerged despite the facts that 1) the goods being valued are familiar market goods for 
actual purchase, 2) income and substitution effects should play no role, 3) subjects appear 
to understand that they have incentives to reveal their true willingness to pay, and 4) 
warm glow considerations should play no role.  Indeed, when warm glow considerations 
are introduced as a predominant consideration in valuation, the order effects are 
eliminated.  Subjects seem more "rational" in assigning maximum amounts to pay to 
donate goods to various charities than they are in valuing goods for their own use. 
  Could the order effects found here (as in Contingent Valuation) be attributed to a 
confused fringe of respondents who do not understand the valuation question being asked 
of them, or who do not care about the goods in question?  We address these possibilities 
by constructing four filters by which confused or indifferent subjects could be identified 
and eliminated ex post from analysis.   These are: 
  Filter I :  exclude all subjects whose reported maximum purchase price in 
    the final practice round differed by more than $.20 from their 
    induced value.  Excludes 34 of 235 subjects.   
  23Filter II:  exclude all subjects whose marginal WTP for a bundle of greater 
scope was negative in any of the three main decision rounds.   
Excludes 11 of 235 subjects. 
Filter III:  exclude all subjects whose highest reported WTP in the three main 
rounds ensured a zero chance of purchasing any of the bundles.  
Excludes 5 of 235 subjects. 
Filter IV:  exclude all subjects whose highest reported WTP in the three main 
rounds ensured a small (2.4% or less) chance of purchasing any of 
the bundles.   Excludes 13 of 235 subjects.  
 
In brief, we find that none of the four confusion or indifference filters eliminates the 
order effects in Treatment II, though the evidence is weakened slightly.  Regression 
analysis analogous to that described above continues to find order effects for all three 
bundle levels (J,  J,S and J,S,C) under all four filters.   However t- tests now find 
evidence of order effects for J only under Filter I, with marginal evidence under Filters 
III and IV, and for J,S under Filters I, III and IV.   Mann Whitney tests now find 
evidence of order effects for J,S only under Filter I.  Appendix 3 provides greater detail. 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion  
  Carefully structured CV studies have found that the valuation of multiple nested 
environmental proposals can be influenced by the order of presentation, even when 
economic theory clearly predicts that order should not matter.  In particular, goods of a 
relatively small scope receive a higher valuation if considered prior to goods of a greater 
  24scope, than if they are considered after (Powe and Bateman 2003, Bateman et al. 2004).  
Such order effects have occurred even when the multiple proposals are valued as 
mutually exclusive alternatives to the status quo, so that income and substitution effects 
and reference utility are controlled.  Researchers have speculated that order effects could 
be caused by the hypothetical nature of CV, with its unclear strategic incentives, inchoate 
preferences over unfamiliar public goods, and potential for free purchase of moral 
satisfaction unrelated to the specific good being valued.   
We have attempted to explore these potential explanations for order effects in CV 
using an incentive compatible valuation experiment over mutually exclusive bundles of 
private market goods, with and without a strong potential for warm glow or “purchase of 
moral satisfaction.”  We find two striking things.  First, there is significant evidence that 
the order effect whereby smaller goods suffer when compared to larger goods may be a 
robust preference phenomenon unrelated to CV per se.  For we find evidence of the same 
effect when subjects report their non-hypothetical maximum WTP for private market 
goods under incentive compatible conditions that they understand to be incentive 
compatible.  Mean WTP for a ten pack of Minute Maid orange juice was $2.40 when 
valued first, but $1.67 when valued after a more comprehensive bundle -- a 43% 
difference.  Similarly, mean marginal WTP for the juice combined with Staples gel ink 
pens and BiC correction tape was $4.58 when valued after a smaller bundle, but $3.48 
when valued after a larger bundle -- a 32% difference.  Such valuations were provided in 
a context where moral satisfaction arguably plays no role.   
  Second, we do not find evidence of order effects when subjects provide their 
maximum WTP to donate the same bundles of goods to charities.  Sugden (1997) and 
  25Nunes and Schokkaert (2003) have proposed that the WTP responses given in CV may be 
divided between “instrumental” and “expressive” values, or alternatively between “use,” 
“existence” and “warm glow” components.  Contrary to the hypothesis of Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992), we find that a higher relative importance of "warm glow" in overall 
WTP eliminates rather than strengthens order effects.   
  One could argue that lab experiments shares key characteristics with CV that are 
responsible for the order effects observed in both.  For both exercises ask people to do 
something unfamiliar in a relatively short space of time (here 90 minutes) -- provide a 
maximum willingness to pay for a good.  Exactly identifying own maximum WTP is not 
something people must commonly do when purchasing items in posted offer markets.  
However, we find that the order effects attenuate but do not disappear when we exclude 
subject responses using four criteria of confusion or indifference to the goods being 
valued.  In addition, the limited time and experience that subjects had in providing 
valuations did not result in order effects when they provided the maximum they would 
pay to donate the same goods to 3 charities.  We speculate that this could be because 
subjects have more experience identifying the maximum amount they will donate to 
charities (though not to donate specific goods to charities) than they have in identifying 
the maximum amount they will pay to purchase items for their own use.  Future research 
could investigate whether order effects in CV could be eliminated by increasing the 
experience respondents have in providing valuations. 
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  29Appendix 1: The distribution of discrepancies between maximum purchase price reported 
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  30Appendix 2: Multivariate Analysis of Order and Scope Effects 
 
Treatment I:  Induced Value Private Goods 
________________________________________________________________________ 
             (1)            (2) 
  Random  Effects    Random  Effects    
  Tobit  Panel  Regression    GLS  Panel  Regression 
 
    W T P        M a r g i n a l   W T P  
______________________________________ _______________________________________ 
 
Constant      5.881
***  Constant         2.695
***  
    (.539)             (.458) 
 
Induced Self Bottom (J)   -2.695
***  Induced Self Top (S)        .171   
    (.516)                     (.648) 
 
Induced Self Top (J)    -2.835
***  Induced Self Bottom (C)    2.098
*** 
    (.761)                  (.648) 
 
Induced Self Top (J,S)     0.030    Induced Self Top (C)      1.708
*** 
    (.761)                  (.648) 
 
Induced Self Bottom (J,S,C)  4.793
***   Induced Self Bottom (S,C)   dropped 
    (.516)        
 
Induced Self Top (J,S,C)  4.433
***   Induced Self Top (S,C)     dropped 




σ e     1 . 6 3 3    σ e         2.067    
σ u     1 . 6 9 0    σ u                0 
 
N
a           120      N
a              80 
  uncensored             120  
  left censored                   0  
 
Log Likelihood                -258.0 
Wald  statistic      416.82   Wald  statistic      16.15 
  Prob > χ
2    .000       Prob  >  χ
2          .001 
 
______________________________________________________________________________  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
***, 
**, 
*  refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Run on Stata 7.0.  
a  For purposes of comparing valuations, the valuations provided 
by 4 subjects in a top down session with induced values set according to those of four missing 
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Treatment II:  Actual Private Goods  
________________________________________________________________________ 
        (3)                       (4) 
  Random  Effects     Random  Effects   
  Tobit  Panel  Regression     GLS  Panel  Regression 
 




Constant     6.471
***    Constant       3.262
***  
     (.635)             (.399) 
 
Self Bottom (J)   -2.261
***    Self Top (S)      -.559 
   (.380)           (.417) 
 
Self Top (J)    -3.600
***    Self Bottom (C)      .203        
     (.603)                (.354) 
 
Self Top (J,S)    -1.660
***    Self Top (C)         .235 
     (.601)                (.417) 
 
Self Bottom (J,S,C)   2.380
***    Self Bottom (S,C)   dropped 
     (.378)         
 
Self Top (J,S,C)     1.022
*      Self Top (S,C)      dropped 
     (.599)         
 
English First Language  -2.623
***    English First Language    -1.441
*** 




σ e    1.832    σ e        1.716     
σ u    2.704    σ u        1.071 
 
N
a         285        N
a          190 
  uncensored        272  
  left censored          13  
 
Log Likelihood             -656.03 
 
Wald statistic      323.06     Wald statistic    21.54 
  Prob > χ
2     .000          Prob > χ
2   .0002 
______________________________________________________________________________  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
***, 
**, 
*  refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Run on Stata 7.0.  
a  One subject provided no demographic data, reducing N from 
288 in (3) and from 192 in (2). 
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Treatment III:  Actual Goods for Donation to Charities 
________________________________________________________________________ 
           ( 5 )              ( 6 )  
  Random  Effects     Random  Effects   
  Tobit  Panel  Regression     GLS  Panel  Regression 
 




Constant   5.565
***    Constant         1.665
***  
   (.761)             (.302) 
 
Charity Bottom (J)  -1.743
***    Charity Top (S)     -.207 
   (.392)           (.425) 
 
Charity Top (J)   -2.422
***    Charity Bottom (C)    -.297        
     (.800)                (.284) 
 
Charity Top (J,S)  -.981      Charity Top (C)      .675 
   (.800)                (.425) 
 
Charity Bottom (J,S,C)  1.984
***     Charity Bottom (S,C)   dropped 
   (.389)         
 
Charity Top (J,S,C)  1.423
*      Charity Top (S,C)   dropped 
   (.798)         
 
Taken Economics  -2.033
***     
   (.584)     
 
 
σ e    1.876    σ e        1.374     
σ u    2.822    σ u        1.551 
 
N      285        N          190 
  uncensored        277  
  left censored            8  
 
Log Likelihood             -670.2 
 
Wald  statistic     204.66    Wald  statistic     11.02 
  Prob > χ
2    .0000          Prob > χ
2    .0116 
 
______________________________________________________________________________  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
***, 
**, 
*  refer to significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Run on Stata 7.0 
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Multivariate Wald Tests Reported in Table 3: 
 
1.  WTPSIB(J) = WTP B SIT(J) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Induced Self Bottom (J) and 
Induced Self Top (J) dummies in regression (1).  
2
1 χ = .03, ρ value = .8536. 
 
2.  WTPSIB(J,S) = WTP B SIT(J,S) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Induced Self Bottom (J,S) and 
Induced Self Top (J,S).  Because Induced Self Bottom (J,S) is the omitted dummy 
variable, this becomes a test of difference from the base intercept, or if the coefficient on 
Induced Self Top (J,S) equals zero in regression (1).  
2
1 χ = .00, ρ value = .9685. 
 
3. WTPSIB(J,S,C) = WTP B SIT(J,S,C) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Induced Self Bottom (J,S,C) and 
Induced Self Top (J,S,C) dummies in regression (1).  
2
1 χ = .22, ρ value = .6362. 
 
4.  WTPSB(J) = WTPST(J) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Self Bottom (J) and Self Top (J) 
dummies in regression (3).  
2
1 χ = 4.89, ρ value = .0270. 
 
5.  WTPSB(J,S) = WTPST(J,S) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Self Bottom (J,S) and Self Top (J,S).  
Because Self Bottom (J,S) is the omitted dummy variable, this becomes a test of 
difference from the base intercept, or if the coefficient on Self Top (J,S) equals zero in 
regression (3).  
2
1 χ = 7.64, ρ value = .0057. 
 
6. WTPSB(J,S,C) = WTPST(J,S,C) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Self Bottom (J,S,C) and Self Top 
(J,S,C) dummies in regression (3).  
2
1 χ = 5.13, ρ value = .0236. 
 
7.  WTPCB(J) = WTPCT(J) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Charity Bottom (J) and Charity Top 
(J) dummies in regression (5).  
2
1 χ = .71,  ρ value = .3978. 
 
  348.  WTPCB(J,S) = WTPCT(J,S) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Charity Bottom (J,S) and Charity 
Top (J,S).  Because Charity Bottom (J,S) is the omitted dummy variable, this becomes a 
test of difference from the base intercept, or if the coefficient on Charity Top (J,S) equals 
zero in regression (5).  
2
1 χ = 1.50, ρ value = .2202. 
 
9.  WTPCB(J,S,C) = WTPCT(J,S,C) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Charity Bottom (J,S,C) and Charity 
Top (J,S,C) dummies in regression (5).  
2
1 χ = .49, ρ value = .4824. 
 
10.  WTPSIB(J) = WTP B SIT(J,S,C)  
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Induced Self Bottom (J) and 
Induced Self Top (J,S,C) dummies in regression (1).  
2
1 χ = 87.72, ρ value = .0000. 
 
11.  WTPSB(J) = WTPST(J,S,C)  
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Self Bottom (J) and Self Top (J,S,C) 
dummies in regression (3).  
2
1 χ = 29.80, ρ value = .0000. 
 
12.  WTPCB(J) = WTPCT(J,S,C) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Charity Bottom (J) and Charity Top 
(J,S,C) dummies in regression (5).  
2
1 χ = 15.66, ρ value = .0001. 
 
13.  MWTPSIB(S) = MWTPSIT(S) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Induced Self Bottom (S) and 
Induced Self Top (S) dummies in regression (2).  Because the former dummy is the 
omitted case, this becomes a test of difference from the base intercept, or if the 
coefficient on Induced Self Top (S) equals zero.  
2
1 χ = .07, ρ value = .7925. 
 
14.  MWTPSIB(C) = MWTPSIT(C)  
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Induced Self Bottom (C) and 
Induced Self Top (C) dummies in regression (2). 
2
1 χ = .36, ρ value = .5474. 
 
15.  MWTPSIB(S,C) =  MWTPSIT(S,C) 
 
This test can be reformulated as a test of whether  
 
MWTPSIB(C) + MWTP B SIB(S) = MWTPSIT(C) + MWTPSIT(S). 
  35Given that the second term of the left hand side is the omitted dummy variable in (2), this 
reduces to a test of whether  
 
MWTPSIB(C) = MWTP B SIT(C) + MWTPSIT(S),   
 
or whether the coefficient on Induced Self Bottom (C) equals the sum of those on 
Induced Self Top (C) and Induced Self Top (S) .  
2
1 χ = .06, ρ value = .8108. 
 
16.  MWTPSB(S) = MWTPST(S) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Self Bottom (S) and Self Top (S) 
dummies in regression (4).  Because the former dummy is the omitted case, this becomes 
a test of difference from the base intercept, or if the coefficient on Self Top (S) equals 
zero.  
2
1 χ = 1.79, ρ value = .1807. 
 
17.  MWTPSB(C) = MWTPST(C) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Self Bottom (C) and Self Top (C) 
dummies in regression (4). 
2
1 χ = .01, ρ value = .9391. 
 
18.  MWTPSB(S,C) =  MWTPST(S,C)  
 
This test can be reformulated as a test of whether  
 
MWTPSB(C) + MWTPSB(S) = MWTPST(C) + MWTPST(S) 
 
Given that the second term of the left hand side is the omitted dummy variable in (4), this 
reduces to a test of whether  
 
    MWTPSB(C) = MWTPST(C) + MWTPST(S) 
 
or whether the coefficient on Self Bottom (C) equals the sum of those on Self Top (C) 
and Self Top (S).  
2
1 χ = .62, ρ value = .4316. 
 
19.  MWTPCB(S) = MWTPCT(S) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Charity Bottom (S) and Charity Top 
(S) dummies in regression (6).  Because the former dummy is the omitted case, this 
becomes a test of difference from the base intercept, or if the coefficient on Charity Top 
(S) equals zero.  
2






  3620.  MWTPCB(C) = MWTPCT(C) 
 
A Wald test of the equality of the coefficients on the Charity Bottom (C) and Charity Top 
(C) dummies in regression (6).  
2
1 χ = .79, ρ value = .3743. 
 
21.  MWTPCB(S,C) = MWTPCT(S,C) 
 
This test can be reformulated as a test of whether  
 
MWTPCB(C) + MWTPCB(S)  =  MWTPCT(C) + MWTPCT(S) 
 
Given that the second term of the left hand side is the omitted dummy variable in (6), this 
reduces to a test of whether  
 
MWTPCB(C) =  MWTPCT(C) + MWTPCT(S) 
 
or whether the coefficient on Charity Bottom (C) equals the sum of those on Charity Top 
(C) and Charity Top (S).  
2








  37Appendix 3:  Summary of Order and Scope Effect Test p Values Using Filters 
 
Filter I:   Confusion on BDM as demonstrated on last practice round. 
    Excludes 7 subjects from Treatment I, 13 from II, and 14 from III.   
Filter II:  Confusion or changed mind as demonstrated by negative MWTP. 
    Excludes 2 subjects from Treatment I, 4 from Treatment II, and 5 from III. 
Filter III:  Indifference to goods as demonstrated by valuations yielding 0 chance of 
purchasing any items.  Excludes 4 subjects from Treatment II, 1 from III. 
Filer IV:  Indifference to goods as demonstrated by valuations yielding ≤ 2.4% chance of 
purchasing any items.  Excludes 4 subjects from Treatment II, and 9 from III. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
         Filter I    Filter II      Filter III        Filter IV 
Test   t   MW  W   t   MW  W     t   MW  W       t   MW  W 
 Hypothesis      p values    p values      p values        p values 
(See Table 3)                                                                                                                         .      
 
   1.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
   2.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
   3.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 
   4.      .086 .190 .053 .198  .409  .083   .102 .344 .077     .102 .344 .077 
   5.      .055 .062 .007 .119  .169  .011   .099 .154 .020     .099 .154 .020 
   6.      .143 .283 .003 .349  .541  .021   .477 .851 .076     .477 .851 .076 
 
   7.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
   8.        ·      ·    .042    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
   9.        ·      ·    .078    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 
 10.      .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000     .000 .000 .000 
 11.      .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000     .000 .000 .000 
 12.      .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000     .000 .000 .000 
 
 13.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 14.         ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 15.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 
 16.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·    .081     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 17.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 18.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 
 19.      .081    ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 20.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
 21.        ·      ·      ·    ·      ·      ·     ·      ·      ·       ·      ·      · 
________________________________________________________________________ 
All tests two tailed.  With the exception of Treatment II test results, only p values that are significant at the 
10% level are included, and are in bold.  t and Mann-Whitney (MW) tests run on SPSS 11.5.  Wald (W) 
tests and regressions run on STATA 7.0.  
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